Abstract. We present a general method for providing Kripke semantics for the family of fully-structural multiple-conclusion propositional sequent systems. In particular, many well-known Kripke semantics for a variety of logics are easily obtained as special cases. This semantics is then used to obtain semantic characterizations of analytic sequent systems of this type, as well as of those admitting cut-admissibility. These characterizations serve as a uniform basis for semantic proofs of analyticity and cut-admissibility in such systems.
Introduction
This paper is a continuation of an on-going project aiming to get a unified semantic theory and understanding of analytic Gentzen-type systems and the phenomenon of strong cut-admissibility in them. In particular: we seek for general effective criteria that can tell in advance whether a given system is analytic, and whether the cut rule is (strongly) admissible in it (instead of proving these properties from scratch for every new system). The key idea of this project is to use semantic tools which are constructed in a modular way. For this it is essential to use non-deterministic semantics. This was first done in [6] , where the family of propositional multiple-conclusion canonical systems was defined, and it was shown that the semantics of such systems is provided by two-valued nondeterministic matrices -a natural generalization of the classical truth-tables. The sequent systems of this family are fully-structural (i.e. include all standard structural rules), and their logical derivation rules are all of a certain "ideal" type. Then single-conclusion canonical systems were semantically characterized in [5] , using non-deterministic intuitionistic Kripke frames. In both works the semantics was effectively used for the goals described above.
The goal of the present paper is to extend the framework, methods, and results of [6] and [5] to a much broader family of sequent systems: the family of what we call basic systems, which includes every multiple-conclusion propositional sequent system we know that has all of Gentzen's original structural rules. Thus this family includes the various standard sequent systems for modal logics, as well as the usual multiple-conclusion systems for intuitionistic logic, its dual, and bi-intuitionistic logic -none of which is canonical in the sense of [6, 5] .
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin by precisely defining the family of basic systems. We then generalize Kripke semantics, and present a general method for providing such semantics for any given basic system. This method is modular, as we separately investigate the semantic effect of every logical rule of a basic system (and in fact even of the main ingredients of such rules), and combine these effects to obtain the full semantics of the system. In a variety of important cases, this leads to the known semantics of the corresponding logic. In addition, this method can be applied to new basic systems, including basic systems with non-deterministic connectives. Based on this method, in sections 5 and 6 we present semantic characterizations of analyticity and cut-admissibility in basic systems. These characterizations pave the way to uniform semantic proofs of these properties.
1
Two important notes before we start: first, we consider here derivations from a set of assumptions (or "non-logical axioms"), and so we deal with strong soundness and completeness, and strong cut-admissibility ( [2] ). Second, we only investigate here propositional systems and logics, leaving the more complicated first-order case to a future work.
Most of the proofs are omitted due to lack of space, and will appear in the full version of the paper.
Preliminaries
In what follows L is a propositional language, and F rm L is its set of wffs. We assume that p 1 , p 2 , . . . are the atomic formulas of L. Since we only deal with fully-structural systems, it is most convenient to define sequents using sets: Definition 1. A signed formula is an expression of the form f:ψ or t:ψ, where ψ is a formula. A sequent is a finite set of signed formulas.
We shall usually employ the usual sequent notation Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of formulas. Γ ⇒ ∆ is interpreted as {f:ψ | ψ ∈ Γ } ∪ {t:ψ | ψ ∈ ∆}. We also employ the standard abbreviations, e.g. Γ, ϕ instead of Γ ∪ {ϕ}, and
An L-substitution is extended to signed formulas, sequents, etc. in the obvious way.
Given a set µ of signed formulas, we denote by frm[µ] the set of (ordinary) formulas appearing in µ, and by sub[µ] the set of subformulas of the formulas of frm [µ] . frm and sub are extended to sets of sets of signed formulas in the obvious way. Given a set E of formulas, a formula ψ (resp. sequent s) is called an E-formula (E-sequent) if ψ ∈ E (frm[s] ⊆ E).
Basic Systems
In this section we precisely define the family of basic systems, and present some examples of them. For doing so, we define the general structure of derivation rules allowed to appear in basic systems. Rules of this structure will be called basic rules. A key idea here is to explicitly differentiate between a rule and its application. Roughly speaking, the rule itself is a schema that is used in proofs by applying some substitution and (optionally) adding context-formulas.
To explain the intuition behind the following definition of a basic rule, we begin with specific examples. Consider the following schemas for introducing a unary connective 2 (used in usual systems for modal logics, see e.g. [17] ):
2Γ here is an abbreviation for {2ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ }. An obvious distinction in these schemas is the distinction between context formulas and non-context formulas (see e.g. [15] ). Here Γ, Γ 1 and Γ 2 are sets of context formulas, and ψ and 2ψ are non-context formulas. While the exact number of non-context formulas is explicitly specified in the scheme, any number of context formulas is possible. These three schemas demonstrate three possibilities regarding context-formulas:
1. No constraint on context-formulas on either side of the sequent (as in (1)). 2. Limiting the allowed set of context-formulas (as in (2), where only 2-formulas may appear on the left, and no context-formulas are allowed on the right). 3. Modifying some context-formulas in the rule application (as in (3), where Γ 1 in the premise becomes 2Γ 1 in the conclusion).
To deal with the different options concerning the treatment of context formulas, we associate with each rule a set of context-relations. The context-relations determine the required relation between the context formulas of the premises of the rule and those of the corresponding conclusion.
Definition 3.
1.
A context-relation is a finite binary relation between signed formulas. Given a context-relation π, we denote byπ the binary relation between signed formulasπ = { σ(x), σ(y) | σ is an L-substitution, and x, y ∈ π}. A pair of sequents s 1 , s 2 is called a π-instance if there exist (not necessarily distinct) signed formulas x 1 , . . . , x n and y 1 , . . . , y n such that s 1 = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, s 2 = {y 1 , . . . , y n }, and x iπ y i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. 2. A basic premise is an ordered pair of the form s, π , where s is a sequent and π is a context-relation. 3. A basic rule is an expression of the form S/C, where S is a finite set of basic premises, and C is a sequent. 4. An application of the basic rule { s 1 , π 1 , . . . , s n , π n }/C is any inference step of the following form:
where σ is an L-substitution, and c i , c i is a π i -instance for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Example 1. Below we present well-known examples of basic rules and context relations used in them (note that the names given here to these context-relations will be used in the sequel):
Implication The usual rules for classical implication are the two basic rules
is the most simple context-relation, and it is used in all sequent systems. By definition, π 0 -instances are the pairs of the form s, s . Thus, applications of these rules have the form (respectively):
For intuitionistic implication, one replaces the second rule with the rule
Thus, applications of this rule allow to infer Γ ⇒ ψ ⊃ ϕ from Γ, ψ ⇒ ϕ. Exclusion The rules for dual-intuitionistic exclusion (in a multiple-conclusion sequent system) are the basic rules [8] ). Applications of these rule have the form:
Modal Necessity Different basic rules for introducing 2 are used in different modal logics (see [17] for a survey; for GL see e.g. [13, 1] ). For example, the systems K, K4, GL, S4 and S5 are obtained by adding the following rules to the standard sequent system for classical logic:
In S4 and S5, the following rule is also added:
Applications of these rules have the form:
Finally, we define basic systems, and the consequence relations induced by them.
Definition 4.
-A basic system G consists of a finite set of basic rules, such that: 1. The identity axiom is in G. The identity axiom is the basic rule ∅/p 1 ⇒ p 1 . Applications of this rule provide all axioms of the form ψ ⇒ ψ.
Applications of this rule allow one to infer
The weakening rules are in G. These are the basic rules { ⇒ , π 0 }/p 1 ⇒ and { ⇒ , π 0 }/ ⇒ p 1 . Applications of them allow one to infer Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ and Γ ⇒ ∆, ψ from Γ ⇒ ∆. We denote by Π G the set of context-relations appearing in the rules of G. -A sequent s follows in basic system G from a set of sequents S (S G s) if there exists a proof in G of s from S.
Example 2. We list some known sequent systems, each of which is either a basic system, or it can easily be shown to be equivalent to a basic system:
-The family of canonical systems studied in [6] (which includes the propositional part of Gentzen's LK for classical logic). -The propositional part of LJ from [14] (the multiple-conclusion version of Gentzen's LJ for intuitionistic logic). -The propositional part of SLK 1 from [8] for bi-intuitionistic logic. -All modal ordinary sequent systems described in [17] , as well as that for GL described in Example 1. -The (fully-structural) sequent systems for finite-valued logics in [3] .
-All paraconsistent sequent systems investigated in [4] .
Kripke Semantics
In this section we introduce a method for providing Kripke semantics for any given basic system. We provide a general definition of a (Kripke-) frame, and show that every basic system G induces a class of frames for which it is strongly sound and complete. Various fundamental soundness and completeness theorems for known logics are easily obtained as special cases.
Definition 5.
A frame is a tuple W, R, v , where W is a set (of worlds), R is a finite set of binary relations on W (called accessibility relations), and v : W × F rm L → {t, f} is a valuation function. Given a frame W, R, v , we say that a signed formula of the form f:
Three notions of truth of sequents are defined as follows: Definition 6. Let W = W, R, v be a frame, and s be a sequent.
1. s is true in some a ∈ W if there exists x ∈ s such that x is true in a. 2. Let R ∈ R. s is R-true in a ∈ W if s is true in every b ∈ W such that aRb.
Since we deal with arbitrary basic systems, no constraints on the set of relations and on the valuation function were imposed in the definition of a frame. These constraints are directly related to the context-relations and the basic rules of a specific basic system. The idea is that each context-relation and each basic rule imposes constraints on the set of frames. Next we describe these constraints.
Definition 7. Let G be a basic system. A frame W = W, R, v is G-legal if the following conditions are met:
(1) R consists of a relation R π for every context-relation π ∈ Π G , where R π0 is the identity relation. (2) For every a, b ∈ W , and π ∈ Π G , if aR π b then for every two signed formulas
x, y such that xπy, either x is not true in b or y is true in a. (3) For every a ∈ W , L-substitution σ, and S/C ∈ G, if σ(s) is R π -true in a for every s, π ∈ S, then σ(C) is true in a. Example 4. We present the constraints imposed by some basic rules according to condition (3) of the previous definition:
(1) Assume that G contains a rule of the form { ⇒ p 1 , π }/ ⇒ 2p 1 . In G-legal frames, v(a, 2ψ) = t whenever v(b, ψ) = t for every world b such that aR π b. Thus this rule imposes the "other half" of the usual semantics of 2.
Assume that G contains a rule of the form { ⇒ , π }/ ⇒ (application of this rule allow to infer s from s where s, s is a π-instance). In G-legal frames, ( ⇒ ) (the empty sequent) should be true in every world, in which it is R π -true. Since ( ⇒ ) is not true in any world, this condition would hold iff for every world a there exists a world b such that aR π b. In other words, if { ⇒ , π }/ ⇒ is in G, then R π should be a serial relation.
Example 5. Let LK be the usual basic system for classical logic. Here Π LK = {π 0 }. In LK-legal frames, R consists of one relation R π0 which is the identity relation. π 0 imposes a trivial condition, v(a, ψ) = v(b, ψ) whenever a = b. The basic rules of LK impose the usual truth-tables in each world, e.g. v(a, ψ ⊃ ϕ) = t iff either v(a, ψ) = f or v(a, ϕ) = t.
Example
Thus the two rules and π int impose the usual Kripke semantics of intuitionistic implication.
We define the semantic consequence relation induced by a basic system G.
Definition 8. Let G be a basic system, and S ∪{s} be a set of sequents. S G s if every G-legal frame which is a model of S is also a model of s.
Remark 1.
It can easily be seen that in any basic system G like LK, in which Π G = {π 0 }, it suffices to consider only trivial Kripke frames which have a single world, and the corresponding accessibility relation is the identity relation.
Theorem 1 (Strong Soundness and Completeness). G = G for every basic system G.
Theorem 1 generalizes several well-known completeness theorems for specific basic systems. For example:
Example 7 (KD). Let KD be the basic system for the modal logic KD (see [17] ) obtained adding the rules { ⇒ p 1 , π K }/ ⇒ 2p 1 and { ⇒ , π K }/ ⇒ to the usual system for classical logic. Applications of the latter allow to infer 2Γ ⇒ from Γ ⇒ . As Π KD = {π 0 , π K }, KD-legal frames include two relations, R π0 (the identity relation) and R π K . Following Examples 3, 4 and 5, all connectives of KD have their usual semantics. By Example 4, in the presence of the second rule, R π K is a serial relation. Thus, we obtain the usual semantics of KD.
Theorem 1 is sometimes difficult to use directly. However, there is a subclass of G-legal frames that is still sufficient for completeness, and in many cases leads to simpler conditions on the accessibility relations.
Definition 9. Given a basic system G, a G-legal frame W = W, R, v is called maximal if for every a, b ∈ W , and π ∈ Π G , aR π b iff (if and only if) for every two signed formulas x, y such that xπy, either x is not true in b or y is true in a. Proposition 1. Let G be a basic system, and W = W, R, v be a maximal G-legal frame. The following hold for every π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ∈ Π G :
(1) If π 1 = ∅, then R π1 is the full relation. (2) Ifπ 3 =π 1 ∪π 2 , then R π3 = R π2 ∩ R π1 . In particular:
(a) Ifπ 1 ⊆π 2 , then R π2 ⊆ R π1 .
(b) Ifπ 1 ⊆π 0 , then R π1 is a reflexive relation.
R π1 is a transitive relation. (4) If xπ 2 y implies yπ 1 x (where f:ψ . = t:ψ and t:
π2 . In particular, if xπ 1 y implies yπ 1 x, then R π1 is a symmetric relation. Example 8. Assume that π 0 , π int ∈ Π G (as in the system for intuitionistic logic). Sinceπ int •π int =π int , R πint is a transitive relation in maximal G-legal frames. Sinceπ int ⊆π 0 , R πint is reflexive. We obtain that in maximal G-legal frames R πint is a preorder, as Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is usually defined.
Theorem 2. Let G be a basic system, and S ∪{s} be a set of sequents. If S G s then there exists a maximal G-legal frame which is a model of S, but not of s.
Taken together, Theorems 1 and 2 imply various well-known completeness theorems for specific basic systems. Indeed, with the exception of GL (which we discuss later), for every system in Example 2 our semantics is equivalent to the usual Kripke semantics of the corresponding logic. Here are some other examples:
Example 9 (KB). Let KB be the basic system for the modal logic KB ( [17] ), obtained from the system for classical logic by adding the rule { ⇒ p 1 , π }/ ⇒ 2p 1 , where π = { f:p 1 , f:2p 1 , t:2p 1 , t:p 1 }. Applications of this rule allow to infer 2Γ ⇒ ∆, 2ψ from Γ ⇒ 2∆, ψ. KB-legal frames include two relations, R π0 (the identity relation) and R π . The rules of KB dictate the usual semantics of modal logic for every connective. By Proposition 1, in maximal KB-legal frames R π is a symmetric relation. It follows that KB is sound and complete with respect to usual symmetric Kripke frames.
Example 10 (Intuitionistic S5). Consider the basic system G 3 from [11] (obtained from the propositional part of LJ by adding the usual S5 rules for 2). Here Π G3 = {π 0 , π int , π S5 }. Maximal G 3 -legal frames include three relations, R π0 (the identity relation), a preorder R πint , and an equivalence relation R π S5 . π S5 and the rules for 2 enforce the usual Kripke semantics of 2 with respect to R π S5 . π int and the rules for the intuitionistic connective dictate the usual Kripke intuitionistic semantics with respect to R πint . Note that π int also enforces persistence of 2-formulas, i.e. if aR πint b and v(a, 2ψ) = t then v(b, 2ψ) = t. This condition is equivalent to the following one: if aR πint b and v(c, ψ) = t for every world c such that aR π S5 c, then v(d, ψ) = t for every world d such that bR π S5 d. The Kripke semantics presented in [11] is not identical to the one obtained by our method. In particular, in our semantics R π S5 should be an equivalence relation, and no direct conditions bind R πint and R π S5 .
Example 11. Consider the basic system G obtained from the propositional part of LJ by adding the rules: { ⇒ ¬p 1 , π S4 }/ ⇒ 2¬p 1 and { p 1 ⇒ , π 0 }/2p 1 ⇒ . Applications of the first rule allow to infer 2Γ ⇒ 2¬ψ from 2Γ ⇒ ¬ψ. Maximal G-legal frames include the identity relation R π0 , and two preorders R πint and R π S4 , such that R πint ⊆ R π S4 . The rules of LJ dictate the usual semantics of the intuitionistic connectives, The two other rules and π S4 impose the following three conditions: (1) if v(b, ¬ψ) = t for every world b such that aR π S4 b then v(a, 2¬ψ) = t; (2) if v(a, ψ) = f then v(a, 2ψ) = f; (3) if v(a, 2ψ) = t then v(b, 2ψ) = t for every world b such that aR π S4 b. As in Example 10, π int also enforces persistence of 2-formulas. But, since R πint ⊆ R π S4 , this condition must hold if (3) holds. In this case we get non-deterministic semantics. To see this, note that if ψ is not of the form ¬ϕ and v(b, ψ) = t whenever aR π S4 b, then v(a, 2ψ) can be freely chosen between t and f.
Remark 2. The last example provides a case in which the various constraints imposed by the rules (and context-relations) of a system do not uniquely determine the truth-value of a compound formula. Another, more natural, example is given by the system for primal intuitionistic logic from [10] (see also [5] ). These examples demonstrate the need in general of non-deterministic semantics.
Example 12 (GL). Let GL be the basic system for the modal logic of provability GL (see Example 1). It is well-known that GL is sound and complete with respect to the set of modal Kripke frames whose accessibility relation is transitive and conversely well-founded. However, GL is not strongly complete with respect to this set of frames ( [16] ), and the compactness theorem fails for the logic induced by this semantics. Using our method, one obtains a different Kripke semantics for GL with an unusual interpretation of 2. Indeed, maximal GLlegal frames include one (non-trivial) transitive relation, R π K4 . The rules and context-relations of GL impose the usual truth-tables in every world for the classical connectives. Concerning 2, a maximal GL-legal frame admits the usual semantics of 2, and it should also satisfy the following condition: if v(b, ψ) = f for some b such that aR π K4 b, then there is some c such that aR π K4 c, v(c, ψ) = f and v(c, 2ψ) = t. By Theorems 1 and 2, GL is strongly sound and complete with respect to this semantics (and so the compactness theorem does hold for this semantic consequence relation). It can easily be verified that every usual GL-frame is GL-legal. However, the converse is not true.
Semantic Characterization of Analyticity
In this section we investigate the crucial property of analyticity in the framework of basic systems. Roughly speaking, a sequent system is (strongly) analytic if whenever some sequent is provable in it (from a set of assumptions), then this sequent can be proven using only the syntactic material available within (the assumptions and) the proven sequent. For the formal definition, we use the following relation:
Definition 10. Let G be a basic system, S ∪ {s} be a set of sequents, and E be a set of formulas. S E G s if there exists a proof in G of s from S, containing only formulas from E.
The following are two major consequences of analyticity.
Proposition 2 (Consistency). Let G be an analytic basic system. Assume that the basic rule ∅/ ⇒ is not in G. Then, G ⇒ .
Proof. Assume that G ⇒ . Since G is analytic, ∅ G ⇒ . The only way one can prove ⇒ without using any formulas, is using a rule of the form ∅/ ⇒ . Proposition 3 (Decidability). Let G be an analytic basic system. Given a finite set S of sequents and a sequent s, it is decidable whether S G s or not.
Proof. Let S be the set of sequents consisting of formulas from sub[S ∪ {s}], and let n = |S |. Since G is analytic, if S G s then there exists a proof of s from S in G having length ≤ n (viewing a proof as a sequence), and consisting only of sequents from S . Thus an exhaustive proof-search is possible.
We shall obtain a characterization of analyticity by identifying a semantic consequence relation that corresponds to E G . For this purpose, we define semiframes.
Definition 12. Let E be a set of formulas.
1. An E-semiframe is a tuple W, R, v , where W and R are as in Definition 5, and v : W × E → {t, f} is a valuation function. 2. Given an E-semiframe W, R, v , a signed formula of the form f:ψ (resp. t:ψ)
is true in some world a ∈ W if ψ ∈ E and v(a,
Note that a frame (Definition 5) is obtained as a special case, when E = F rm L .
Definition 13.
Given an E-semiframe W = W, R, v and a sequent s:
1. s is true in some a ∈ W if s is an E-sequent and there exists x ∈ s such that x is true in a. 2. Let R ∈ R. s is R-true in a ∈ W if s is an E-sequent and s is true in every b ∈ W such that aRb. 3. W is a model of a sequent s if s is true in every a ∈ W . W is a model of a set of sequents S if it is a model of every s ∈ S.
(Maximal) G-legal semiframes are defined as follows:
Definition 14. Let G be a basic system, and E be a set of formulas.
-An E-semiframe W = W, R, v is G-legal if the following hold:
(1) R consists of a relation R π for every context-relation π ∈ Π G , where R π0 is the identity relation. (2) For every a, b ∈ W , and π ∈ Π G , if aR π b then for every two signed E-formulas x, y such that xπy, either x is not true in b, or y is true in a. (3) For every a ∈ W , L-substitution σ, and S/C ∈ G, if frm[σ(C)] ⊆ E, and σ(s) is R π -true in a for every s, π ∈ S, then σ(C) is true in a. -A G-legal E-semiframe W = W, R, v is called maximal if for every a, b ∈ W and π ∈ Π G , the converse of the condition in (2) holds as well. The above characterization might be quite complicated to be used in practice. We present a simpler sufficient criterion: Corollary 2. Let G be a basic system. If every maximal G-legal E-semiframe can be extended to a G-legal frame for every finite set E of formulas closed under subformulas, then G is analytic.
The last corollary provides a uniform and simple method of proving that a specific basic system is analytic. Indeed, the required "extension property" can very easily be proved for the Kripke semantics of various basic systems mentioned above. This includes (the propositional parts of): LK, LJ , SLK 1 from [8] , various systems for modal logics from [17] (including those presented in Examples 7 and 9), the family of coherent canonical systems from [6] , and many more. Hence all of them are analytic.
Remark 3. The criterion given in Corollary 2 is not necessary for analyticity. For example, the system GL (see Example 12) is analytic (and even enjoys strong cut-admissibility, as can be shown by a straightforward generalization of the proof of cut-admissibility for it given in [1] ), yet it does not meet the semantic condition of Corollary 2. To see this, let E = {p 1 , 2p 1 }, and let W = W, {R π K4 }, v be an E-semiframe, where W = {a, b}, R π K4 = { a, a , a, b },  v(a, p 1 ) = v(b, p 1 ) = v(a, 2p 1 ) = f and v(b, 2p 1 ) = t. W is a maximal GL-legal E-semiframe, but it cannot be extended to a GL-legal frame: there is no way to assign a truth-value to 22p 1 . This phenomenon might be connected with the fact that the natural first-order extension of GL does not enjoy cut-admissibility ( [1] ). Further research is needed to clarify this issue (and hopefully to find an effective semantic criterion which is both sufficient and necessary).
Remark 4. While analyticity is defined using the subformula relation, it is also possible to study more general notions of analyticity. Indeed, let be any partial order on F rm L , such that {ψ | ψ ϕ} is finite and computable for every ϕ. For every set S of sequents, let [S] = {ψ | ∃ϕ ∈ frm[S].ψ ϕ}. It is now possible to define -analyticity as in Definition 11 with instead of sub. Consistency and decidability of a basic system follow from its -analyticity. By a straightforward generalization of Corollary 1, we obtain that a basic system G is -analytic iff S G s implies S
[S∪{s}] G s. This can be used for basic systems which are not strictly analytic, but are nevertheless -analytic for some well-founded partial order on F rm L . For example, this is the case with some systems of the family LJ(S) in [4] , which extend LJ with different rules for negation. For these systems, it can be proven that whenever S s, then there also exists a proof involving only subformulas of S ∪ {s} and their negations.
Semantic Characterization of Strong Cut-Admissibility
While analyticity of a proof system suffices for many desirable properties, cutadmissibility is traditionally preferred (especially if all other rules enjoy the subformula property, in which case cut-admissibility implies analyticity). Since in this work we deal with proofs from arbitrary sets of assumptions (not necessarily the empty one), we again consider a stronger property: the one which was called strong cut-admissibility in [2] . In this section we provide a semantic characterization of the basic sequent systems which enjoy this property. This characterization can serve as a uniform basis for semantic proofs of many (strong) cut-admissibility theorems in various basic systems.
Definition 16. Let G be a basic system, S ∪ {s} be a set of sequents, and E be a set of formulas. S basic rules were all either singletons or empty, and only one context-relation was involved in every basic rule. We leave it as a further research to exploit the full power of this framework. In addition, the following extensions of the framework will be investigated in the future: single-conclusion systems, hypersequential systems, systems employing more than two signs, substructural systems, first order logics and beyond.
